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Abstract:  Using nationally representative data from the NLSY97, financial motivations 
for and the effects of employment on U.S. college students’ academic performance are 
examined.  While it is expected that fewer financial resources and a higher cost of college 
cause greater student employment, the data indicate that the number of hours a student 
works per week is unaffected by either the level of parental transfers or the cost of 
schooling.  Contrary to existing evidence that a greater number of hours worked leads to 
poorer academic performance, the number of hours worked per week does not negatively 
affect a student’s GPA and may actually improve it.   
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**Corresponding Author I. Introduction 
When college students lack adequate resources to cover college expenses due to 
insufficient parental transfers and borrowing constraints, they may participate in market work as 
a means of financing their studies.  Federal and state work study programs were designed to 
subsidize some of this employment in order to help more students afford college.  Yet, there is 
some debate as to whether college student employment is beneficial or detrimental to students’ 
academic performance.  College student employment may be beneficial if it provides students 
with valuable work experience.  Stephenson (1981); Michael & Tuma (1984); Ruhm (1995, 
1997); Light (1999, 2001); and Neumark & Joyce (2001) all find positive effects of student 
employment on future outcomes, holding schooling constant.  However, college employment 
may also have a detrimental effect as time spent in market work reduces time available for the 
accumulation of schooling-related human capital.  In addition, fatigue from extensive 
employment hours may reduce the productivity of schooling-related activity that does occur 
(Oettinger 1999).  Loury and Gorman (1995) as well as Jones and Jackson (1990) find that 
college grades, one measure of schooling-related human capital, have a substantial positive effect 
upon early career earnings.  Therefore, an examination of the effect of employment on student 
achievement as measured by student grades is important.  
There have been several studies of the relationship between market work and academic 
achievement in both high school and college.  Ruhm (1995, 1997) and Tyler (2003) find that 
employment while in high school has a negative effect on both the number of years of schooling 
completed and 12
th grade math achievement.  Oettinger (1999) finds that the grades of minority 
students suffer the most from working long hours while in high school.  Paul (1982) finds that 
employment while in college negatively affects grades in macroeconomic principles courses.  Ehrenberg & Sherman (1987) find that weekly hours worked decrease the probability that a 
student enrolls in college in a subsequent year and, for those who do enroll, reduces the 
probability that they graduate on time.  However, they find no effect upon college GPA.  More 
recently, Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2003) and Oettinger (2005) provide evidence that 
working while in college has a harmful effect on a student’s grade point average (GPA).   
This paper improves upon several limitations of the college employment studies.  First, 
these studies are not representative of all college students.  Paul (1982) focuses only on grades in 
macroeconomics principles courses at one college, Ehrenberg & Sherman (1987) examine only 
male high school graduates that are enrolled in college full-time, and Stinebrickner & 
Stinebrickner (2003) and Oettinger (2005) each examine students from only one college.  This 
paper attempts to remedy this deficiency in the literature by using a nationally representative 
sample of first-year college students from Rounds 1-6 of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1997 (NLSY97) to provide results applicable to the general college-age population.  
Second, these studies pay very little attention to the financial motivations for college 
student employment, and the evidence they provide is mixed.  Dustmann and Micklewright 
(2001) and Pabilonia (2001) find that middle and high school students who work more receive 
lower parental transfers than their peers who do not work or who work fewer hours.  Similar to 
those findings, Oettinger (2005) observes that college students work more if parents provide less 
financial support.  Wolff (2005), however, finds that parental transfers have no effect on the 
employment of 16-22 year olds in France, although he makes no distinction between high school 
and college students.  The need to pay for schooling is an important motivation for college 
student employment that does not apply to high school students.  College students face 
borrowing constraints because guaranteed student loan maximums are set well below the full 
  2cost of college, and financial aid awards (including guaranteed student loan awards) are not 
adjusted in the face of parents’ unwillingness to pay.  If parental transfers are insufficient to 
cover the cost of postsecondary schooling, students may turn to employment to cover these 
costs.
1  This paper attempts to address these gaps in the literature by focusing on financial 
motives for college employment.
2   
To illustrate these plausible motives, a simple variant of a time allocation model with 
parental transfers is presented.  In this model, a student allocates his time between schooling and 
market work while parents simultaneously make their own consumption and transfer decisions.  
Thus, parental transfers are treated as endogenous to schooling and work decisions as in Keane 
and Wolpin (2001) and Kalenkoski (2005b), but in contrast to Oettinger (2005), who treats 
parental transfers as exogenous.  The model motivates testing of several hypotheses.  First, 
smaller parental transfers result in longer hours worked while in college, all else ─ including the 
price of schooling net of scholarships ─ held constant.  Second, an increase in the net price of 
schooling, holding parental transfers and everything else constant, leads to an increase in hours 
worked.  Finally, an increase in hours worked leads to lower student achievement, all else equal.   
Thus, this paper attempts to answer two questions.  First, do fewer parental resources or a 
higher net price of schooling result in greater labor supply by college students?  Second, does 
college students’ increased labor supply while in school result in lower academic achievement, 
as measured by their GPA?  To answer these questions, single equation, instrumental variable 
estimation techniques that address sample selection and endogenous right hand side variables are 
                     
1 Kalenkoski (2005a) shows that a substantial portion of parents transfer less than their Expected 
Parental Contribution (EPC) towards their child’s postsecondary education, suggesting that 
students must either choose a lower cost schooling alternative or fund the higher-priced 
schooling some other way, perhaps through student employment.   
2 Students may work to support living expenses when setting up a new household in a dorm or 
apartment.  This study will not consider these effects or the costs of room and board due to lack 
of data.
  3used.  Two primary equations are estimated:  1) an hours worked equation in which the predicted 
parental transfer and the predicted net price of schooling enter as the key right hand side 
variables, and 2) a college GPA equation in which a predicted hours worked variable enters as 
the key right hand side variable.  The results indicate that the data do not support the hypotheses 
that decreased parental transfers and an increased net price of schooling result in increased hours 
worked.  Students may be working for extra spending money or to support general living 
expenses rather than to finance their postsecondary education, suggesting that the motivations for 
subsidizing work study jobs be examined.  The data also do not support the hypothesis that 
increased work hours negatively affect a student’s grades.  In fact, the evidence suggests that 
working while in college actually improves academic performance.  Therefore, it appears that 
work study programs, while not actually aiding student financing of college tuition and fees, may 
be beneficial in terms of students’ academic achievement.  The next section presents the 
theoretical motivation for the analysis.  Section III describes the data.  Section IV presents the 
econometric model.  Section V presents the results.  Finally, Section VI concludes this paper. 
 
II. Theoretical Motivation 
A simple theoretical model illustrates the potential financial motives behind college 
student labor supply.  Let L be the fraction of time a student spends working, and let 1-L be the 
fraction of time the student spends in schooling-related activity, such as in-class time (credit 
hours) and study time.  For simplicity, the model abstracts from leisure time.  Let academic 
achievement, A, be given by the function 
A = A(1-L, μ) ,         ( 1 )  
  4where ∂A/∂(1-L) > 0, that is, academic achievement is a positive function of student effort, and μ 
is a vector of background characteristics such as the child’s ability, current human capital, and 
family’s socio-economic characteristics that affect his production of academic achievement.   
There are two decision-makers in this model, a selfish child and an altruistic parent.  The child’s 
utility is given by  
Uc = Uc(Cc,   A ) ,        ( 2 )  
where Cc is the child’s consumption.  This utility function is assumed to be strictly concave in Cc 
and A.  Note that the child’s utility is specified to depend directly on the child’s academic 
achievement.  There are several reasons that the child may care about academic achievement.  
First, higher achievement is likely to increase the child’s future income.  In this case A could be 
replaced with Y(A) in the utility function, where Y stands for future earnings and Y′(A) > 0.  
However, higher future earnings may not be the only reason the child may value academic 
achievement.  Higher academic achievement may lead to more desirable future job 
characteristics or a better future quality of life.  The child may also enjoy current consumption 
value of a college education.  Rather than sort through all these possibilities, we leave utility in 
this general form.  Assuming no borrowing against future earnings, the child’s budget constraint 
is given by 
wL + t = Ps(1-L) + Cc,        ( 3 )  
where w is the child’s wage, t is the transfer the child receives from the parent, and Ps is the price 
per unit of schooling that can be thought of as the cost per credit hour net of financial aid.  While 
the assumption of no borrowing is not quite realistic, college students do face borrowing 
constraints given loan maximums that do not cover the full cost of schooling (Keane and Wolpin 
2001) and loan awards that do not depend upon parental unwillingness to pay (Kalenkoski 
  52005b).  In addition, there is little information in the NLSY97 on student loans.  Therefore, this 
assumption is made to keep things simple and tractable.   
The parent’s utility is given by 
Up = Up(Cp, Uc),       (5) 
where Cp is the parent’s consumption.  The parent’s budget constraint is given by 
Mp = Cp  +   t ,         ( 6 )  
where Mp is the parent’s income, which is taken as exogenous.  
It is assumed that the parent and child make their decisions independently, given their 
knowledge about the other party’s decision rule.  Thus, the child will choose the amount of time 
spent in market work, L, in order to maximize his or her utility, given the parent’s transfer 
function.  At the same time, the parent chooses t to maximize his or her utility, given the child’s 
labor supply function.  The parent’s transfer function and the child’s labor supply function can 
then be solved to determine the Nash equilibrium, L* and t*.
3
In order to obtain reaction functions, it is assumed that the academic achievement 
function is given by 
A = k(1-L) + μ,        ( 7 )  
where k is a constant greater than zero and the background factors, μ, enter additively.  It is also 
assumed that the child’s utility function is Cobb-Douglas and is given by 
Uc(Cc, A) = Cc
αA
1-α,        ( 8 )  
                     
3 There are several ways the model could be extended to account for multiple children.  A crude 
way would be to redefine Mp as the portion of the parent’s income that is available for this 
particular child and let it be a function of the number of siblings, e.g. Mp = Mp(N), dMp/dN < 0.  
Alternatively, consumption of siblings can be included as a separate term in the parents’ utility 
function or it can be thought to be subsumed in the parents’ consumption variable.   
 
  6where α is a constant between 0 and 1 and measures the relative importance of the child’s current 
consumption.  Note that this specification does not allow for a “no schooling” choice as the 
empirical analysis focuses on individuals who have already chosen some positive level of 
postsecondary schooling.  However, the possibility of the “no college” choice is accounted for in 
the empirical analysis using selection correction methods.  Finally, it is assumed that the parent’s 
utility function is also Cobb-Douglas and is given by 




1-β,     (9) 
where β is a constant between 0 and 1 and measures the relative importance of a parent’s current 
consumption.   
Rearranging (3) and substituting into (8) along with (7) gives 
Uc(L) = [wL + t – Ps(1-L)]
α[k(1-L) + μ]
1-α.    (10) 
The child chooses L to maximize (10).  Rearranging the first order necessary condition for a 
maximum gives the student’s labor supply (reaction) function: 
L = [α(w + Ps)(k + μ) + (1-α)k(Ps – t)]/[k(w + Ps)].   (11) 
It can be shown that ∂L / ∂t < 0.  That is, greater parental transfers mean less student labor 
supplied, all else equal.  It can also be shown that ∂L / ∂Ps > 0.  That is, given parental transfers, 
an increase in the price of schooling means more labor supplied, all else equal.  Estimation of 
(11) in Section V will reveal whether the data support these predictions.  Finally, it can be shown 
that the sign of ∂L / ∂w is ambiguous.  It is positive if parents transfer more than the cost of 
schooling and negative if parents transfer less than the cost of schooling.  
Rearranging (6) and substituting along with the rearranged (3) and (7) into (9) gives 
Up(t) = (Mp – t)
β[(wL + t –Ps(1-L))
α(k(1-L) + μ )
1-α]
1-β. (12) 
  7The parent chooses t to maximize (12) given L.  Rearranging the first order necessary condition 
for a maximum gives the parent’s transfer (reaction) function: 
t = [α(1-β)Mp – L(βw + βPs) + βPs] / [α(1-β) + β].   (13) 
It can be shown that ∂t / ∂L < 0, ∂t / ∂Ps > 0, and ∂t / ∂w < 0.  Thus, greater student labor supply 
leads to fewer parental transfers, a higher price of schooling leads to greater parental transfers, 
and a higher student wage leads to lower parental transfers.   
The reaction functions (11) and (13) are then solved to determine the reduced form 
expressions for the optimal levels of L and t.  In Section V, a reduced form equation for t is 
estimated and a predicted transfer is then generated and included as an explanatory variable in 
the regression for hours worked. 
 
III. Econometric Model 
The theoretical model presented in Section II provides the motivation for testing several 
hypotheses.  First, fewer parental transfers lead to an increase in hours worked while in college, 
all else – including the net price of schooling – held constant.  Second, an increase in the net 
price of schooling, holding parental transfers and everything else constant, leads to an increase in 
hours worked.  Finally, an assumption of the model, based on previous empirical evidence, is 
that an increase in hours worked reduces student achievement, all else equal.  To test these 
hypotheses, two primary equations are estimated:      
h = Xβ1 + σ1e1      ( 1 4 )  
A = hβ2 + Zβ3 + σ2e2  ,    (15) 
where h is a student’s weekly hours worked; A is the student’s GPA; X is a vector of explanatory 
variables that includes parental transfers, the price of schooling net of financial aid, measures of 
  8labor market conditions, and demographic characteristics to control for heterogeneous 
preferences; Z is a vector of personal and family characteristics that may affect individual 
production of academic achievement; β1 and β3 are vectors of coefficients; β2 is the coefficient on 
hours worked; σ1 and σ2 are unknown scale parameters; and ei ~ N(0,1), i = 1, 2.  Although e1 and 
e2 are likely to be correlated since there are potentially unobserved personal characteristics that 
affect both hours worked and academic achievement, equations (14) and (15) are separately, not 
jointly, estimated due to the need to address selectivity concerns to be described below.   
Assuming e1 is uncorrelated with X and e2 is uncorrelated with Z, equations (14) and (15) 
could be estimated using OLS.  OLS estimates of β1, β2, and β3 are likely to be biased, however, 
if the error terms in (14) and (15) are correlated with X and Z.  One reason for concern is that, 
although the theoretical model treats the net price of schooling as exogenous, actual tuition and 
fees charged minus financial aid per term (the net price variable used in the analysis) could be 
considered a schooling expenditure variable that depends on both the quantity and quality of 
schooling chosen.  Thus, a predicted variable is used to replace this potentially endogenous 
variable in the relevant equations.  Including such a predicted variable controls not only for the 
cost of schooling but also for the quantity and/or quality of schooling chosen.  Another 
endogeneity concern relates to parental transfers.  Parental transfers are potentially endogenous 
as they are chosen simultaneously with the student’s hours worked in the theoretical model.  
Therefore, they must also be replaced by a predicted variable in these equations.  Finally, the 
model assumes that a student’s GPA is a direct function of chosen hours worked and so is 
simultaneously chosen with hours worked.  Thus, the hours worked variable is endogenous in the 
GPA equation and a predicted hours worked variable replaces the endogenous one in this 
equation.   
  9A second reason OLS coefficient estimates may be biased is that, for data reasons to be 
discussed in the next section, (14) and (15) are estimated using selected samples.  Equation (14) 
suffers from two sources of sample selection bias.  The first source of selection bias is that the 
sample includes only individuals who enroll in postsecondary school.  This is because we want 
to test predictions regarding financial motivations for employment and the effect of employment 
on GPA for individuals who are enrolled in college.  However, there are individuals in the 
analysis sample who are not enrolled and are thus at a corner solution.  Let s* be a latent variable 
measuring the benefits of attending postsecondary school.  A postsecondary enrollment selection 
equation can be written: 
s* = Vθ2 + v2,      (16) 
where V is a vector of explanatory variables that includes X plus one additional variable 
necessary for identification to be described in the data section, θ2 is a vector of coefficients, v2 ~ 
N(0,1) and corr(v1, v2) = ρ.  Although s* is unobserved, if s* > 0 then the child enrolls.  Let S be 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if s* > 0 and equal to 0 otherwise.  S is observed for all 
individuals. 
The second source of selection bias is that the sample includes only those enrolled 
individuals who work a positive number of hours.  Let h* be a latent variable measuring the 
college student’s desired hours of work:    
h* = Xθ1 + v1,      (17) 
where X is the vector of explanatory variables found in equation (14), θ1 is a vector of 
coefficients and v1 ~ N(0,1).  Note that h* is unobserved.  However, if the desired hours of work 
are positive (h* > 0), then a positive number of hours are worked.  Let H be an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if h* > 0 and equal to 0 otherwise. 
  10An observation is a member of the select sample used to estimate the hours equation (14) 
if H = 1 and S = 1.  Thus, the regression function for the hours equation (14) for this subsample 
may be written as 
       E(h | X, ψ) = Xβ1 + σ1E(e1 | X, ψ)   (18) 
where ψ denotes the joint outcome of the two selection rules given by (16) and (17).  Following 
Tunali (1986), (18) can be rewritten 
    E ( h   |   X ,   ψ) = Xβ1 + α1λ1 + α2λ2 + σ1w1 (19) 
where α1 and α2 are regression coefficients, w1 = e1 – α1λ1 – α2λ2  with E(w1 | h* > 0, s* > 0) = 0, 
and λ1 and λ2 are highly nonlinear functions of ρ, θ1, and θ2.
4  As Tunali (1986) notes, λ1 and λ2 
are the double-selection analogs of the inverse Mill’s ratio that arises in the context of single-
selection.   
The GPA equation (15) suffers from only one source of selection because GPA is 
available for all enrolled students, whether or not they were working.  Thus this equation needs 
only one selectivity correction term and can be written 
    E ( A   |   h ,   Z ,   γ) = hβ2 + Zβ3 + ηλ + σ2w2 (20) 
where η is a regression coefficient, λ is the inverse Mill’s ratio, γ is the outcome of the selection 
rule given by (16), and w2 = e2 – ηλ with E(w2 | s* > 0) = 0. 
In order to estimate (19) and (20), the potentially endogenous variables need to be 
replaced by predicted variables and estimates of λ1, λ2, and λ must be constructed.  Let   
denote the vector that includes these predicted variables.  To construct  , a two stage 
procedure is followed.  First, a conditional bivariate probit model is estimated, where S and H 
X ˆ
2 1 λ ˆ    and   λ ˆ
                     
4 See Tunali (1986) for exact formulas. 
  11are the dependent variables and V and X are the respective vectors of explanatory variables.  The 
estimates  ,  , and   are then substituted into the formulas for λ ρ ˆ 1 θ ˆ
2 θ ˆ
1 and λ2 to get the estimates 
.  To construct an estimate of   to include in the GPA equation, a similar two-stage 
procedure is followed.  First, a probit model in which S is the dependent variable and V is the 
vector of explanatory variables is estimated.  The estimate of   is then substituted into the 
formula for λ  to get λ .  Thus, (19) and (20) become 
2 1 λ ˆ    and   λ ˆ λ ˆ
2 θ ˆ
ˆ
E(h |  ,ψ) =  β X ˆ X ˆ 1 + α1 1 λ ˆ  + α2 2 λ ˆ  + σ1w1.    (19΄) 
E(A |  ,  , γ) =  β h ˆ Z ˆ h ˆ
2 +  β Z 3 + η  + σ λ ˆ
2w2.    (20΄) 
 
Note that   are identified in equation (19΄) and   is identified in (20΄) because of 
nonlinearities in the formulas used to construct them and by the inclusion of one additional 
variable in V that is not included in X.
2 1 and   λ ˆ λ ˆ   
                    
λ ˆ
5  Note also that h is identified in equation (20΄) due to 
labor market and financial variables described in the next section that are included in   but not 
in  .  Finally, note that the errors in both equations are heteroscedastic because of the inclusion 
of the selectivity correction terms.  Thus, corrections for heteroscedasticity and for the 
substitution of predicted variables for potentially endogenous variables are needed.  To obtain 





It is also important to note that data limitations necessitate estimating the predicting 
equations for  using selected samples.  This is because the net price of schooling and the level 
of parental transfers are observed only for enrolled individuals and positive values for parental 
X ˆ
 
5 See Tunali (1986). 
6 Standard errors are based on 200 replications. 
  12transfers are observed only if students reported receiving them.  Procedures similar to those used 




The primary data used in this analysis come from the NLSY97 geocode file Rounds 1 
through 6.  The NLSY97 youth respondents and one of their parents were first surveyed for 
Round 1 between January and October, 1997 and between March and May, 1998.  This cohort of 
the NLSY97 is representative of the non-institutionalized U.S. population aged 12-16 on 
December 31, 1996 and included 8,984 youth respondents in the initial round.  In subsequent 
years, only the youths were interviewed. 
In 1997, only a few of the youth respondents had completed a college term (either a 
semester, trimester, or quarter).  By Round 6, at least 3,062 of the youths had finished at least 
one term in college after receiving their high school diploma.  The enrollment status of some 
participants could not be determined due to nonresponse in later collection rounds.  After 
deleting these observations and also observations with missing information on other key 
variables, the sample is reduced to 5,970 individuals, 1,768 of whom have completed a college 
term.  Table A1 in the Appendix gives means and standard deviations for the full NLSY97 
sample and the sample used in our analysis. The background characteristics are very similar. 
However, the percentage of enrolled individuals is significantly lower in the analysis sample.  
Only respondents’ first term college experience is examined in order to obtain the largest sample 
possible and to also insure that the college term dynamics are similar.  In addition, it is important 
to investigate the effects of employment on academic achievement in the first term because 
  13students are more likely to drop out of college in the first year (Stratton, O’Toole, & Wetzel 
2005) and college drop-outs have significantly lower earnings than college graduates.  Thus, a 
pooled cross-section of students’ first college experiences from the fall term of 1996 through the 
spring term of 2002 is examined.   
Both part-time and full-time students are included in the sample because hours spent in 
schooling-related activity is chosen simultaneously with hours spent in market work in the 
model.  Time spent in schooling-related activity is also more accurately captured as a continuous 
variable rather than a dichotomous one.  Students have a wide range of credit hours for which 
they can register and can choose to study as much or as little as they like.  According to the 
model, if one knows what happens to hours spent in market work one also knows what happens 
to hours spent in schooling-related activity.
7
The two primary dependent variables used in this analysis are the student’s GPA, a 
measure of student academic achievement, and hours worked.  GPA is measured on a 0-4 scale.  
If the respondent reported his or her GPA on a scale of 100, 0-5, or 0-10, it was converted to a 0-
4 scale.  Since the analysis uses first-term college students who are most likely fulfilling core 
college requirements, students’ choice of courses should not have a great effect upon GPA.  
The hours worked variable is the number of hours worked during a specific week during 
the first college term.  The week used for each term was chosen somewhere in mid-term to avoid 
the beginning of terms and final exams, when students are more likely to work fewer hours or 
not hold a job.  The week chosen also depended upon the different college term systems 
reported.   The weeks chosen were the first week in the months of February, May, October, and 
December.   
                     
7 Sensitivity analyses using both separate part-time and full-time student samples and separate 
four-year college students and other college students were performed and the results were quite 
similar to those presented in the empirical results section. 
  14Auxiliary dependent variables used in the selectivity correction procedures include three 
dichotomous variables for whether or not a respondent enrolled in college, whether or not a 
student received a parental transfer, and whether or not a student worked during his or her first 
college term. 
The independent variables used in this analysis come from the NLSY97 and other data 
sources which have been matched to the NLSY97 using either the respondent’s state of residence 
while in high school or the college identification variable (UNITID) available in the geocode 
version of the NLSY97. One of the primary explanatory variables used in the analysis is the 
dollar value of schooling-related parental transfers measured in 1997 dollars.  The Consumer 
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) is used to convert all monetary values into 1997 
dollars.  This variable comes from a series of questions in the NLSY97 about the sources of 
financial assistance received by the student during the student’s first term in college.  Amounts 
that are included are financial aid received by a youth from both biological parents, his biological 
mother and stepfather, and/or his father and stepmother and that the youth was not expected to 
repay.
8  Sixty-six percent of first-term college students received a parental transfer with an 
average transfer received of $3,310 per term (see Appendix Table A1).  This is quite close to the 
average transfer of $3,300 in Oettinger’s (2005) single university sample although it is in 1997 
dollars while Oettinger’s average is in 2002 dollars.  Recall that parental transfers are potentially 
endogenous as they are simultaneously chosen with hours worked and schooling in the 
theoretical model.  The instrument used to predict transfers is the average in-state tuition for 
four-year public institutions in the respondent’s high school state of residence, obtained from the 
Digest of Education Statistics and converted to 1997 dollars.  In-state tuition is expected to affect 
                     
8 A family transfer, which includes parental transfers and any transfers from other  
family members, was also explored but the results were virtually identical.   
  15parental transfers because in-state public universities usually are the lowest cost option for 
students and this cost may be the baseline to which their parents compare tuition prices.  The 
average state grant per 18-24 year old, as it reflects state financial aid to postsecondary students, 
may also affect parental transfers as grants are likely substitutes for parental transfers 
(Kalenkoski 2005a).  This variable is calculated by dividing total state grants from the Digest of 
Education Statistics by state population aged 18-24 from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.   
Another key explanatory variable is the net price of schooling. When deciding which 
college to attend students are faced with a sticker price and, if applicable, an offered financial aid 
package for each school under consideration.  This variable is defined to be tuition and fees 
minus scholarships for the first college term in which the student is enrolled and is measured in 
1997 dollars.  Information on tuition and fees for each institution comes from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) maintained by the National Center for Education 
Statistics.  IPEDS data are matched to the NLSY97 data using a college identification number.  
The dollar value of scholarships received by students is constructed from the NLSY97 youths’ 
responses to the same series of questions as the parental transfer variable.  Loans are excluded 
from the net price of schooling measure for several reasons.  First, they cannot theoretically be 
subtracted from the price as are scholarships because they need to be repaid.  Second, the number 
of observations reporting positive loan amounts is quite small.  However, as a robustness check, 
such a measure was constructed but not well predicted.  Because the net price of schooling 
variable is potentially endogenous, the respondent’s number of siblings from Round 1 of the 
NLSY97 is used as an instrument. This variable is intended to measure parental resources 
available to support the respondent’s postsecondary education and is considered by colleges 
when determining financial aid awards.  It thus affects the net price of schooling offered to the 
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trade off the quality and quantity of children (Becker 1976).  If the number of children is chosen 
simultaneously with parental expenditures on postsecondary education, these instruments are 
invalid.  However, given the length of time between birth and postsecondary attendance and the 
uncertain nature of financial aid awards over such long time horizons, this concern appears to be 
minimized.
9
Parents’ income and net worth as measured in 1996 are provided in the first round of the 
NLSY97 and are included as measures of the parents’ financial resources.  There are a large 
number of missing values for these variables.  Therefore, missing values are recorded as zeros 
and missing data indicator dummy variables for parents’ income and net worth are included.  
Missing values are an even bigger problem for the respondent’s wage as wage information is 
missing for most respondents in the NLSY97.  Thus, two variables are included to proxy for the 
respondent’s wage.  The first is the average weekly wage in the state of the respondent’s high 
school residence, converted to 1997 dollars.  This comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Covered Employment and Wages (ES-202) program.  The second variable, perhaps more 
applicable to young workers, is the effective minimum wage.  The effective minimum wage is 
defined as the maximum of the state and federal minimum wages.  As a measure of labor market 
conditions, the unemployment rate in the state of the respondent’s high school residence from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program is included.  
Another labor market variable used is an indicator for whether or not the state where the 
respondent’s high school is located had a work study program throughout the period under study.  
This variable is constructed using historical information on state work study programs collected 
                     
9 In an attempt to limit the number of instruments needed, a “cost to student” variable equal to 
the net price of schooling minus parental transfers was created and a predicting equation 
estimated.  However, this variable was not well-predicted. 
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used to identify hours in the GPA equation.  
Personal background variables, such as age on December 31, 1996, race, whether or not 
the respondent is Hispanic, mother’s education as of 1997, father’s education as of 1997, the 
respondent’s high school grades from transcripts, and the respondent’s ASVAB scores, are 
included to control for heterogeneous preferences and productivity in producing academic 
achievement.
 10  Finally, the percent of the state population that is of traditional college age (18-
24), a proxy for college acceptance rates, is included to identify the conditional bivariate probits 
estimated as part of the selectivity correction procedures.  These data come from the State and 
County Quick Facts published online by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
 
V. Results 
Table 1 shows results from the predicting equation regressions for the net price of 
schooling and parental transfers.  Recall that the net price of schooling is potentially endogenous 
as it varies with the quantity and quality of schooling and that its predicting equation is estimated 
on the select sample of students who first enrolled in college during the period 1996-2002.  Thus, 
a selectivity correction term, λ, is also included as a regressor in this equation.  Appendix Table 
A2 gives the results of the enrollment probit estimation used to create this term.  The selectivity 
correction term is identified in the net price of schooling equation by a variable measuring the 
percent of the population aged 18-24, a proxy for college acceptance rates that is included in the 
enrollment equation but excluded from the net price of schooling equation.  The selectivity 
correction term is also identified by nonlinearities in the formula used to construct it. 
                     
10 ASVAB scores have a mean latent ability score of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
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identifying the predicted net price of schooling in the hours equation.  Two of the three are also 
individually statistically significant, as expected.  The average in-state tuition for public four-
year institutions is a positive and significant predictor of the net price of schooling.  If average 
in-state tuition were to rise by $1, the net price of schooling faced by the family would increase 
by 27 cents.  The average state grant per 18-24 year old is also statistically significant.  For every 
hundred dollars of state grants per 18-24 year old made available, the net price of schooling 
faced by a family falls by $200.  Each additional sibling lowers the net price of schooling by 
$222.  This is reasonable given that colleges and universities take into account the number of 
siblings in college when awarding financial aid. 
 Several family background variables are also significant predictors of the net price of 
schooling.  Having a parent with a four year degree or having parents with higher income or net 
worth positively affects the net price of schooling.  These results are not surprising as more 
educated and well-off parents can afford and may be willing to pay more for their children’s 
education.  Their children are also less likely to receive need-based financial aid.   
Parental transfers are also endogenous as they are chosen simultaneously with hours 
worked in the theoretical model.  The predicting equation for these transfers is found in the 
second column of Table 1.  Note that because the transfer equation is estimated on the select 
sample of students who enrolled in a first term of college during the period 1996-2002 and 
reported receiving a transfer, two selectivity correction terms, λ1
t and λ2
t, are included as 
regressors.  Appendix Table A3 provides the results of the estimated conditional bivariate probit 
used to create these terms.  The conditional bivariate probit is identified by excluding the percent 
of the population aged 18-24 from the transfer receipt equation but including it in the enrollment 
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formulas used to construct them.   
Not surprisingly, the results in Table 1 indicate that parental transfers are positively and 
significantly affected by having parents with high net worth.  In addition, they are positively 
affected by mother’s education.  The instruments in the parental transfer equation are jointly 
significant at the 1% level, thus identifying the predicted parental transfer in the hours worked 
equation.  In addition, average in-state tuition is also individually significant and positive, which 
supports the notion that parental transfers increase as the price of their child’s lowest cost 
schooling option increases.   
Table 2 presents the results for three specifications of the hours worked equation: OLS 
estimates in column I, a specification in column II that includes predicted variables but not 
selectivity correction terms, and the theoretically preferred specification in column III that 
includes predicted variables and selectivity correction terms.  Recall that OLS estimates are 
suspect because of the potentially endogenous transfer and net price variables and the select 
sample of working students.  Note that in this specification neither the net price of schooling nor 
the parental transfer is a statistically significant determinant of hours worked, suggesting that 
students are not working to pay for the cost of schooling.  Age, however, is statistically 
significant, suggesting that older first term students work more than younger ones.  The results 
also suggest that the more education a student’s father has, or the greater the parents’ net worth, 
the fewer the hours the student works.  Also, students with better high school grades work less 
while in college.  Finally, three of the labor market variables are significant.  The greater the 
state unemployment rate, the poorer are economic conditions and the greater is the number of 
hours a student works, perhaps through fear of losing his job.  Similarly, if the state average 
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worked because a student’s employment is more secure in better economic times.   
The results in Column II control for the endogeneity of the net price of schooling and 
parental transfers in the hours worked equation but do not control for selection into the working 
student sample.  Again, neither the net price of schooling nor the parental transfer has a 
statistically significant effect on the number of hours a student works.  Likely students are 
instead working to pay for living expenses or other consumption.  This result differs from that of 
Oettinger (2005) who finds a statistically significant decrease in college students’ hours worked 
as the amount that parents contribute rises, although he treats parental transfers as exogenous.   
Note, however, that the point estimates of the coefficients on these variables have 
changed substantially.  The coefficient on the net price of schooling falls from 0.178 to -0.412, 
while the coefficient on the parental transfer falls from practically 0 to -0.511, suggesting 
endogeneity of these variables plays some role.  Other variables with significant coefficient 
estimates in the OLS specification have similar point estimates in specification II, although they 
are less precisely estimated in specification II as a result of using predicted variables and 
bootstrapped standard errors (see Tunali 1986).    
When both predicted variables and selectivity correction terms are included in 
specification III, again neither the predicted net price of schooling nor the predicted parental 
transfer is significant.  This result is thus robust across all specifications, providing substantial 
evidence that students are not motivated by the need to pay for schooling expenses or insufficient 
parental transfers to work more hours.  The point estimates on these predicted variables are also 
quite similar to those in specification II.  It is important to note, however, that nothing is 
statistically significant at conventional levels in specification III due to the much larger standard 
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endogenous regressors (see Tunali 1986) and selection correction.  However, the t-statistic for 
λ1
w is greater than one, providing weak evidence of selection, and it is informative to look at 
changes in the point estimates of key coefficients as a result of correcting for both endogeneity 
and selectivity.  The point estimates for age, the father having a high school degree, and the state 
unemployment rate change little.  However, the effect of a father having a four year degree and 
the effect of net worth change sign.  There is also a substantial change in the estimated effect of 
high school grades on hours worked.  This estimated coefficient is less than half the size of the 
estimates in either of the other specifications.  All of these changes suggest that students with 
non-college-educated fathers, parents with lower net worth, and those who have lower 
achievement in high school are more likely to work while in college.   
Note that besides the large standard errors generated by the two-stage procedure, an 
additional potential contributor to the lack of statistically insignificant results in specification III 
is a potential collinearity problem caused by the selectivity correction terms being highly 
correlated with the other included variables.  Recall that these terms are nonlinear functions of 
the estimated coefficients and explanatory variables in the enrollment/work bivariate probit 
model, where most of the explanatory variables are the same as those in the predicting and hours 
worked equations and that they are identified in the hours worked equation primarily by 
nonlinearities in their formulas due to the limited availability of instruments.  Therefore, these 
selectivity correction terms may not adequately address selection and may even confound 
estimates.   
Given these concerns with specification III, two predicted hours worked variables to be 
included in separate specifications of the GPA equation are constructed, one from hours worked 
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(predicted variable #2).   
Table 3 presents three separate estimates of the GPA equation.  The first set of estimates 
in Column I are the OLS estimates.  In this specification, hours worked have no effect on a 
student’s GPA, a result consistent with that found by Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987).  Parents’ 
net worth is only marginally statistically significant and economically insignificant, suggesting 
that an increase in parents’ net worth of $10,000 increases a student’s GPA by only .001.   
Perhaps this variable is simply capturing remaining family preferences toward education after 
controlling for parents’ education.  High school grades do have a significant positive effect, 
however.  An increase in a student’s high school GPA by 1.0 increases a student’s first term 
college GPA by .172, suggesting that student academic ability and/or skills prior to the start of 
college have a significant impact on how well the student does in college.  Similarly, a student’s 
ASVAB standardized test score in arithmetic reasoning has a significant positive effect on a 
student’s GPA.   
Column II provides the results of the GPA equation that corrects for selection into college 
and the endogeneity of hours worked using a predicted hours worked variable based on the 
estimates in Column II of Table 2.  Like the OLS estimates, hours worked have a statistically 
insignificant effect on a student’s college GPA.  The magnitude of the point estimate is increased 
substantially, however, from 0.001 to 0.017 compared to the OLS estimates, suggesting that 
correcting for selection into college and the endogeneity of hours worked is important. If 
significant, this estimate would suggest that an additional hour worked leads to an improvement 
in GPA by almost .02, a result quite different from the negative effects found by Stinebrickner 
and Stinebrickner (2003) and Oettinger (2005).  The negative effect of being male and the 
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investments) on college GPA are also strengthened.   
Column III of Table 3 presents the results of the GPA equation that corrects for selection 
into college and the endogeneity of hours worked using the theoretically preferred predicted 
hours worked variable based on the estimates in Column III, Table 2.  In this specification, the 
hours worked coefficient has an estimated coefficient of 0.018 that is now marginally statistically 
significant.  This positive estimate is inconsistent with previous estimates in the literature that are 
negative and statistically significant (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003; Oettinger 2005) and 
the assumption made in the theoretical model presented in this paper.  However, a positive 
coefficient is reasonable if working while in college is complementary to the learning process.  
Perhaps working more hours causes students to better organize their time, appreciate the world 
of work and the value of their education, and/or is simply complementary to their chosen field.  
The estimated effects of being male and high school grades on GPA are again strengthened 
compared to the OLS estimates and even compared to the estimates using the alternative 
predicted variable.  The results indicate that being male, high school grades, and hours worked 
while in school are all significant determinants of academic performance in college.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
Student work is often proposed as a means of financing a student’s postsecondary 
education, and sometimes it is subsidized via state and federal work study programs.  In this 
paper, several hypotheses regarding the financial motives and academic effects of college student 
employment are examined.  First, this study investigates whether the net price of schooling faced 
by a student and his family positively affects the number of hours a student works.  Regression 
  24results indicate, however, that the net price of schooling has no effect.  Second, this study also 
examines whether the amount of schooling-related transfers received from parents negatively 
affects the number of hours a student works.  Results indicate that the amount of parental 
transfers received also does not affect the number of hours a student works.   Together these 
results suggest that students are working not to finance tuition and fees but rather personal 
consumption and/or living expenses while in college.  Thus, work study subsidies may be 
financing such consumption and/or living expenses.  This issue needs to be further examined by 
looking more closely at data on students participating in federal and state work study programs.   
Finally, this study examines whether an increase in hours worked negatively affects a 
student’s GPA and finds that rather than having a negative effect, additional hours worked have a 
positive effect on academic performance.  This finding is important as it contradicts previous 
evidence in the literature that suggests a detrimental effect.  It also suggests that federal and state 
work study programs may in fact be beneficial.  However, this research is the first such study 
that uses nationally representative data.  It also only focuses on one measure of academic 
performance and includes only the first-term of college experience.  Thus, more research on the 
effects of college student employment using nationally representative data and exploring other 
measures of academic performance is needed. 
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Table 1. Predicting Equations (Dependent variables in 1,000s) 
 
Independent Variables 
Net Price of 
Schooling
   Parental 
Transfers 
 
Age on December 31, 1996  0.312
(0.145)












**   -0.761
(0.661)
Other race (nonwhite)  -2.678
(1.559)
*   -1.842
(1.221)
Mother high school degree  0.167
(0.311)
   1.210
(0.510)
** 
Mother 4 year degree  0.993
(0.389)
**   1.736
(0.524)
*** 
Father high school degree  -0.063
(0.226)
   -0.174
(0.373)
Father 4 year degree  0.520
(0.283)
*   0.734
(0.656)
Parents’ income (in 10,000s)  0.258
(0.062)
***   0.405
(0.277)
Parents’ income squared  -0.010
(0.002)
***   -0.011
(0.010)
Parents’ net worth (in 10,000s)  0.026
(0.011)
***   0.069
(0.020)
*** 
Parents’ net worth squared  -0.000
(0.000)
*   -0.000
(0.000)
*** 
High school grades  -0.136
(0.097)
   0.137
(0.302)
ASVAB – arithmetic reasoning  -0.096
(0.193)
   -0.131
(0.290)
ASVAB – word knowledge  0.121
(0.187)
   -0.377
(0.511)
ASVAB – paragraph comprehension  -0.193
(0.178)
   0.048
(0.335)
ASVAB – mathematical knowledge  0.115
(0.217)
















State unemployment rate  -0.035
(0.090)
   -0.199
(0.155)
 
State average wage  0.004
(0.002)
**   0.002
(0.004)
 
State minimum wage  -0.437
(0.320)
   0.001
(0.518)
 
State work study program  0.001
(0.184)
   -0.415
(0.277)
 
Avg. in-state tuition for public 4-year 
institutions (in 1,000s) 
0.265
(0.124)
*   0.425
(0.222)
* 
State grant per 18-24 year old  -0.002
(0.002)
**   0.004
(0.003)
 







*    
λ1




t      -0.526
(1.188)
 
Number of observations  1,768     1,131  
R-squared 0.10     0.19  
F-statistic [3,1735] for joint sign. of instruments  3.62      
F-statistic  [5,631] for joint sign. of instruments           10.10  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significance levels: * = p<.10; ** = p<.05;  
*** = p<.01.  Models also include an intercept and missing dummy variables.   
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Independent  variables  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Age 1.116**  0.467  1.225**  0.551  0.961    1.382 
Male 0.314  0.966  0.625  1.208  3.943   2.841 
Hispanic -0.772   1.399  -1.312  1.563  -0.455   2.417 
Black -1.503  1.271  -1.943  2.168  3.988   6.363 
Other race (nonwhite)  2.089  5.209  0.896  8.394  6.087  13.477 
Mother high school degree  0.467  1.369  0.556  1.690  0.053   2.539 
Mother 4 year degree  -2.015  1.622  -1.267   2.095  0.077   3.653 
Father high school degree  -2.210*  1.212  -2.389*  1.385  -2.357  1.946 
Father 4 year degree  -2.377*  1.424  -2.040  1.926  1.814   4.142 
Parents’ income (in 10,000s)  0.303  0.344  0.435  0.541  0.428   1.001 
Parents’ income squared  -0.010  0.012  -0.013  0.020  -0.005   0.036 
Parents’ net worth (in 10,000s)  -0.094*  0.062  -0.065  0.076  0.176   0.231 
Parents’ net worth squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001   0.001 
High school grades  -1.814*** 0.385  -1.845**  0.930  -0.565  1.817 
ASVAB – arithmetic reasoning  1.125  1.058  1.092  1.220  2.97   2.585 
ASVAB – word knowledge  -0.030  0.968  0.127  1.037  -0.366   1.689 
ASVAB – paragraph comprehension  -1.085  1.003  -1.343  1.106  -2.228   1.476 
ASVAB – mathematical knowledge  -1.799*  0.989  -1.870*  1.080  -2.671  2.245 
State unemployment rate  1.313**  0.512  1.139*  0.615  1.587  1.017 
State average wage  -0.010**  0.005  -0.006   0.008  0.001   0.015 
State minimum wage  0.494  1.341  0.244  1.606  -0.390   2.975 
State work study program  0.838  0.976  0.542  1.244  -0.632    1.993 
Predicted net price of schooling (in 
1,000s) 
   -0.412 2.226  -0.469   3.488 
Predicted parental transfer (in 1,000s)      -0.511  0.978  -0.783   1.361 
Net price of schooling (in 1,000s)  0.178  0.165         
Parental transfer (in 1,000s)  -0.000  0.000         
λ 1
w         -25.482  21.679 
λ 2
w          0.011   4.401 
Number of observations  959  959  959 
Adjusted R-squared  0.08  0.11  0.11 
F-statistic [6, 928] for joint sign. of 
instruments 
2.62 1.89   
F-statistic [6, 926] for joint sign. of 
instruments 
       .97 
Bootstrapped standard errors are presented for columns II and III.  Significance levels: * = p<.10; ** = 
p<.05, *** = p<.01.  Models also include an intercept and missing dummy variables.   
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#2 and Selectivity 
Correction 
Independent  variables  Coef.   S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Age  0.017 0.018 0.020  0.031 0.009     0.03 
Male  -0.114***  0.039 -0.131*** 0.043 -0.151**  0.043 
Hispanic  0.034 0.059 0.037   0.062 0.047   0.062 
Black  -0.069  0.049 -0.034   0.055 -0.043   0.056 
Other race (nonwhite)  -0.200  0.216  -0.251   0.236  -0.119   0.231 
Mother high school degree  0.027  0.060  0.038   0.069  0.076   0.068 
Mother 4 year degree  0.035  0.063  0.097  0.070  0.08   0.071 
Father high school degree  -0.023  0.051  0.024   0.066  0.015   0.065 
Father 4 year degree  0.006  0.051  0.057   0.064  0.004   0.063 
Parents’ income (in 10,000s)  -0.009  0.013  -0.006  0.017  -0.006   0.017 
Parents’ income squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000   0.001 
Parents’ net worth (in 10,000s)  0.001*  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.003   0.003 
Parents’ net worth squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000 
High  school  grades  0.172***  0.016 0.214*** 0.026 0.217***0.026 
ASVAB – arithmetic reasoning  0.080*  0.043  0.054  0.049  0.054   0.048 
ASVAB – word knowledge  0.053  0.034  0.057  0.038  0.057   0.037 
ASVAB – paragraph comprehension  -0.017   0.036  0.010   0.041  -0.012   0.040 
ASVAB – mathematical knowledge  -0.005  0.038  0.072  0.054  -0.076    0.053 
Predicted hours      0.017  0.012  0.018*  0.011 
Hours  0.001  0.001             
λ       0.112  0.097  0.122     0.097 
Number of observations  1,768  1,768  1,768 
R-squared  0.14          
Adjusted  R-squared      0.13  0.13 
Bootstrapped standard errors are presented for columns II and III.  Significance levels: * = p<.10; ** = 
p<.05; *** = p<.01.  Models also include an intercept and missing dummy variables.   
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Table A1. Key Variab tatistics  le Sample S  
  Analysis Sample Full Sample
Variable Name  Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Obs. Mean  S.D. 
Work (enrolled)  1768 0.54    2918 0.53   
Hours of Work (enrolled)  959 25.10 0.55  1628  25.70  0.45 
Predicted Hours of Work  5970 27.14 0.08  -  -  - 
College GPA  1727 3.02 0.02  2331 3.08  0.06 
Enrollment  5970 0.30    8984 0.41   
Net price of schooling (in 1,000s)  1768 0.40 0.09  2516 0.48  0.08 
Predicted net price of schooling (in 1,000s)  5970 0.51 0.02  -  -  - 
Parental transfer receipt (enrolled)  1768 0.66    3062 0.66   
Parental transfer (positive values) (in 
1,000s) (enrolled) 
1131 3.31 0.15  1701 3.17  0.12 
Predicted parental transfer (in 1,000s)  5970 2.16 0.03  -  -  - 
Age on December 31, 1996  5970 13.85 0.02 8984 14.00  0.02 
Male  5970 0.52    8984 0.51   
Hispanic  5970 0.13    8984 0.13   
Black  5970 0.16    8984 0.15   
Other race (nonwhite)  5970 0.01    8984 0.01   
Mother’s education missing  5970 0.21    8984 0.22   
Mother high school degree  4690 0.47    6784 0.47   
Mother 4 year degree  4690 0.22    6784 0.24   
Father’s education missing  5970 0.13    8984 0.14   
Father high school degree  5126 0.29    7537 0.30   
Father 4 year degree  5126 0.19    7537 0.22   
Parents’ income missing  5970 0.09    8984 0.09   
Parents’ income (in 10,000s)  5367 6.54 0.10  8001 6.87  0.09 
Parents’ net worth missing  5970 0.24    8984 0.24   
Parents’ net worth (in 10,000s)  4496 15.86 0.77 6621 17.04  0.72 
High school grades missing  5970 0.11    8984 0.09  0.004 
High school grades (0-8 scale)  5267 5.67 0.03  7669 5.77  0.02 
ASVAB scores missing  5970 0.16    8984 0.15   
ASVAB – arithmetic reasoning  4911 -0.35 0.02  7076 -0.26  0.01 
ASVAB – word knowledge  4911 -0.52 0.01  7076 -0.44  0.01 
ASVAB – paragraph comprehension  4911 -0.26 0.01  7076 -0.17  0.01 
ASVAB – mathematical knowledge  4911 -0.11 0.02  7076 0.02  0.01 
State average unemployment rate  5970 4.53 0.01  8976 4.52  0.01 
State average weekly wage  5970 610.50 1.36 8976 613.73  1.26 
State minimum wage  5970  4.99  0.00  8976  4.99  0.00 
State work study program  5970  0.40    8894  0.41  0.01 
Avg. in-state tuition for public 4-year 
institutions (in 1,000s) 
5970 3.28 0.01  8880 3.29  0.13 
 
State grant per 18-24 year old  5970  111.84  1.38  8880  114.76  1.28 
Number of siblings  5970  1.54  0.02  8926  1.53  0.02 
Means and standard errors have been weighted. 









   
S.E. 
Age 0.408***  0.019 
Male -0.160***  0.046 
Hispanic 0.030   0.067 
Black 0.332***  0.061 
Other race (nonwhite)  0.024  0.229 
Mother high school degree  0.197***  0.061 
Mother 4 year degree  0.386***  0.082 
Father high school degree  0.198***  0.060 
Father 4 year degree  0.229***  0.077 
Parents’ income (in 10,000s)  0.088***  0.017 
Parents’ income squared  -0.003***  0.001 
Parents’ net worth (in 10,000s)  0.006**  0.003 
Parents’ net worth squared  -0.000*  0.000 
High school grades  0.239***  0.017 
ASVAB – arithmetic reasoning  -0.040  0.050 
ASVAB – word knowledge  0.111**  0.047 
ASVAB – paragraph comprehension  0.059  0.048 
ASVAB – mathematical knowledge  0.506***  0.048 
State average unemployment rate  -0.064**  0.030 
State average wage  0.004***  0.000 
State minimum wage  -0.579***  0.077 
State work study program  0.074  0.050 
Avg. in-state tuition for public 4-year institutions (in 
1,000s) 
0.116*** 0.033 
State grant per 18-24 year old  -0.001***  0.000 
Number of siblings  -0.027  0.018 
State % of the population aged 18-24  0.305***   0.043 
Number of observations  5,970 
LR chi-squared(33)  3043.99 
Pseudo R-squared  0.42 
Significance levels: * = p<.10; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.01.  Model also includes an 
intercept and missing dummy variables.   
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Table A3.  Transfer Receipt and Postsecondary Enrollment: Conditional Bivariate Probit 
for Double Selection Correction 




Independent  Variables  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.   S.E. 
Age  -0.122*** 0.044  0.409*** 0.018 
Male 0.002  0.068  -0.160***  0.046 
Hispanic  -0.082 0.100  0.031 0.067 
Black  -0.271*** 0.318  0.331*** 0.061 
Other race (nonwhite)  -0.528*  0.369  0.049  0.229 
Mother high school degree  0.198**  0.101  0.199***  0.061 
Mother 4 year degree  0.194*  0.121  0.384***  0.081 
Father high school degree  0.066  0.088  0.205  0.060 
Father 4 year degree  0.250**  0.102  0.226***  0.077 
Parents’ income (in 10,000s)  0.118***  0.026  0.089***  0.017 
Parents’ income squared  -0.004***  0.001  -0.003***  0.001 
Parents’ net worth (in 10,000s)  0.009**  0.004  0.006**  0.003 
Parents’ net worth squared  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000**  0.000 
High  school  grades  -0.112*** 0.032  0.239*** 0.017 
ASVAB – arithmetic reasoning  -0.043  0.074  -0.039   0.050 
ASVAB – word knowledge  -0.231***  0.066  0.110**  0.048 
ASVAB – paragraph comprehension  0.068  0.070  0.057  0.048 
ASVAB – mathematical knowledge  0.111  0.083  0.506**  0.047 
State average unemployment rate  -0.002  0.037  -0.065**  0.030 
State average wage  -0.001**  0.001  0.004***  0.000 
State minimum wage  0.141  0.110  -0.585***  0.077 
State work study program  0.049  0.070  0.074  0.050 
Avg. in-state tuition for public 4-year 
institutions (in 1,000s)  -0.069
 
* 0.041  0.118
 
*** 0.033 
State grant per 18-24 year old    0.001**  0.001        -0.001***  0.000 
Number of siblings  -0.057**  0.027  -0.024  0.018 
State % of the population aged 18-24      0.305***  0.042 
Number of observations  5,970       
Censored Observations  4,202       
Uncensored Observations  1,768       
Log likelihood  -3154.55       
ρ -0.43       
LR test of independent equations  
(ρ = 0) chi-squared(1) 
5.60  Prob>chi-squared = 0.02 
Significance levels: * = p<.10; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.01.  Model also includes an intercept and 
missing dummy variables.   
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Selection Correction 




Independent  Variables  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.   S.E. 
Age 0.015  0.051  0.408***  0.019 
Male  -0.209*** 0.068  -0.160*** 0.046 
Hispanic  -0.070 0.101  0.030 0.067 
Black  -0.401*** 0.091  0.332*** 0.061 
Other race (nonwhite)  -0.357  0.322  0.024  0.229 
Mother high school degree  0.037  0.101  0.198***  0.061 
Mother 4 year degree  -0.074  0.119  0.385***  0.082 
Father high school degree  -0.106  0.089  0.199***  0.060 
Father 4 year degree  -0.239**  0.098  0.229***  0.078 
Parents’ income (in 10,000s)  -0.000  0.025  0.088***  0.017 
Parents’ income squared  -0.000   0.001  -0.003***  0.001 
Parents’ net worth (in 10,000s)  -0.015***  0.004  0.006**  0.003 
Parents’ net worth squared  0.000***  0.000  -0.000**  0.000 
High school grades  -0.085**  0.036  0.239***  0.017 
ASVAB – arithmetic reasoning  -0.126*  0.073  -0.040  0.050 
ASVAB – word knowledge  0.033  0.067  0.111**  0.047 
ASVAB – paragraph comprehension  0.053  0.069  0.059  0.048 
ASVAB – mathematical knowledge  0.051  0.084  0.506***  0.048 
State average unemployment rate  -0.025  0.037  -0.064**  0.030 
State average wage  -0.000  0.001  0.004***  0.000 
State minimum wage  0.044  0.117  -0.579***  0.077 
State work study program  0.061  0.068  0.074  0.051 
Avg. in-state tuition for public 4-year 
institutions (in 1,000s)  0.034
 
0.040    0.116
 
*** 0.033 
State grant per 8-24 year old  -0.000   0.001  -0.001***  0.000 
Number of siblings  0.008  0.027  -0.027  0.018 
Avg. % of the population aged 18-24      0.304***  0.043 
Number of observations  5,970       
Censored Observations  4,202       
Uncensored Observations  1,768       
Log likelihood  -3270.74       
ρ -0.03       
LR test of independent equations  
(ρ = 0) chi-squared(1) 
0.03  Prob>chi-squared = 0.86 
Significance levels: * = p<.10; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.01.  Model also includes an intercept, age, 
and missing dummy variables.   
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